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MODERATOR: To wind up our day at the Central Intelligence Agency we are very privileged to have as our final speaker Mr. Richard Helms, the Deputy Director of the Agency. (Applause)

DDCI: It has been a great pleasure and privilege for us to have you out here today. I happened to pass, as I came down, one of the previous speakers, and he said, "It's a damn frisky group down there -- the fall must have gotten into their blood today." I don't know what you did to him -- he didn't seem tattered or torn, but he at least seemed to be mentally alert by the time you had finished.

Obviously, the purpose of having these talks today is to try and acquaint you a little more with the doings and works and organization of this Agency, and I hope that the objective has been achieved. This is not a very well understood organization. As you know, it's a much criticized outfit. How much of the criticism is valid and how much is not valid is probably not for me to say, but a good deal of it originates in ignorance or at least innocence of what we do and what we're trying to do. But if you go away today with the recognition that we are a part of the governmental team, that we want to work with all agencies of Government, and that, last but not least, we are basically a service organization designed to help you and others like you in your various future assignments, then I think the day will have been worthwhile from our standpoint. We are going to do our job well in

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direct proportion to the extent to which we can assist you and we can assist all departments of Government. We have no illusions about this, we are not complacent about it, we recognize this is the case, and we're doing the best we know how.

To the extent that I care to make any remarks this afternoon, I would like to touch on two or three things that I would specifically like to underline. One of the principal charges made of the Central Intelligence Agency is that it tends to make policy, on the one side, and tends to freewheel in carrying out some of its operations, on the other. We do not make policy, and we do not freewheel. Those are two rather flat statements, but they are also truthful statements. Foreign policy is made by the State Department, defense policy is made in the Defense Department, and other policies are made elsewhere, but they aren't made in this Agency.

When we are carrying out an operation overseas we carry it out with the full authority of the United States Government or we don't carry it out at all. As you know from what you've heard earlier, the Director reports to the National Security Council, which in effect means that he reports to the President. By law he's not beholden to any other department of Government, and in the minds of the Congress this was the only sensible way to establish this Agency so that it was not obliged at any time or at any place to do anything which was other than either objective or at least the way it saw

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conditions in various parts of the world. In other words, departmental intelligence is not part of our job, nor are we interested in being influenced by the various competing demands for money or manpower that various departments have up with the Congress from time to time. But this also has to do with the policy making aspects of life, because the President, sitting as he does in our form of government and under our Constitution, has a variety of responsibilities, and these responsibilities in turn have nothing to do with individual departments, or at least the parochialism of individual departments and agencies.

Now as far as our overseas operations are concerned, there is a mechanism which has been devised, and has been in existence for some time, which is designed to provide the approval or the clearance or the authority - whatever word you choose to use - for each and every one of these operations. This little group that does this has been variously known as the Special Group, the 303 Committee -- it has had various names and various incarnations, but through the months and years has sat essentially as it sits today. It is composed of McGeorge Bundy as the Chairman, who represents the President. Sitting for the State Department these days is Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who represents the Secretary of State. Deputy Secretary Vance sits for the Defense Department and represents the Secretary of Defense. And

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Admiral Raborn sits representing the Agency. These four gentlemen meet approximately once a week with an Executive Secretary who keeps the minutes, and they are agreed minutes, and each and every operation which the Agency is going to conduct overseas in the political field, paramilitary field, economic warfare, any of a whole host of things, is presented to this group and secures the group's approval, otherwise it does not go forward.

There are times when there are disagreements in the group, or there are varying points of view, and, depending on the circumstances, the decision may in the end be made by the President himself. But since in our form of government this type of thing should not be put on the President's platter, the 303 Committee is there not only as a group to sit in judgment on the validity and wisdom of these projects but even, and equally important, to protect the President from criticism for something that goes wrong, even though he may have been privy to the fact that it was going on all the time -- and he is normally kept very well informed on these matters.

In addition to this group, we appear before the standard number of Congressional committees -- we appear before the same number of Congressional committees that everybody else in Washington appears before, and that's four - two in the House and two in the Senate. We appear either every week or every couple of weeks before our principal subcommittees -- and of course less frequently before the Appropriations Committees -- but

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nevertheless, they are kept currently informed not only as to the state of the world as seen through the Director's eyes but also as to the various operations and types and kinds of things we are doing around the world.

Lastly, there is an organization known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is chaired by Mr. Clark Clifford and has a distinguished group of public citizens sitting on it - such individuals as General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral (Sides), Gordon Gray, Frank Pace, William Baker of Bell Labs, Edwin Land from Polaroid Camera Company, Robert Murphy of ambassadorial fame, William Langer, Professor of History at Harvard, and so on. And this group meets periodically with various members of the Agency, usually for two or three days at a time, goes over the various programs, organizational matters, operations, things that have gone right and things that have gone wrong, and on behalf of the President conducts a type of watchdog function, if you like, in addition to all the other watchdog functions which are performed. So when you take these three elements -- or if you include the National Security Council, four elements -- the Central Intelligence Agency and its work is really well supervised, and supervised to a degree that apparently has not conveyed itself to many people in the American public at large.

Tied into this, of course, is the role of the Ambassador overseas, who, as the principal representative of the President and the

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It is obvious, I think, to anyone that if an Ambassador is against something in his area it would be pretty hard to get it through. I know of only one instance in my years around here where there was a difference of opinion between the Ambassador and the Administration in Washington, so the matter was referred to the President, who decided what the final position should be. But as you can imagine, under those circumstances only the President can decide.

Thus, briefly, I have tried to (paint in) the approval authority and the supervision under which we operate. I could go on at much greater length, of course, and in much greater detail, but I think that this should suffice to convey to you what I said at the outset - that we do not go

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off on our own, that we do not freewheel, and that we are well and carefully supervised.

I would like to say as a footnote to all this that it certainly does not help our operations or help our work to have as much publicity about them as there seems to be from time to time. Various books and articles and so on, made up partly of fact, partly of fancy, partly truth, partly error - partly all kinds of things - indeed, I suppose, contribute a certain amount to the fund of public knowledge, but they certainly make a lot of difficulties for us and for our people who are trying to do these jobs. And I guess that probably the most unfortunate aspect of it all is that these books are used as textbooks by various foreign chiefs of government who desire to convince their people, and their cabinet, and others, that the United States is up to no good and the no goodest part of it is the Central Intelligence Agency. I don't think - in a free society and constituted as we are - that this will ever stop. I think that most of us are relatively well resigned to it, because there is no way of stopping it -- and maybe it's undesirable to stop it. I'm not sitting in judgment on it, I'm just saying that it makes a tough job tougher. But it does not help to have the people who are privy to the things that we do contributing this information to outsiders, which simply puts water on a wheel that we would prefer to see go much more slowly.

The CIA was founded in 1947. In the ensuing years we

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have done the best we knew how to try and make this into a professional intelligence organization, with various departments and competing demands. We've put a lot of emphasis on our program of recruiting and training, and as the years have gone by we have developed, I think, a cadre of competent, experienced, and hard-hitting officers and analysts and specialists of various types and kinds - which really cover a rather wide spectrum, from pilots who fly tricky airplanes to fellows that make sabotage devices, economic analysts, and God knows what all.

I think some of the figures about the people in the Agency are not without interest. I think you will probably agree that by and large statistics are like a bikini bathing suit - they reveal the interesting and hide the vital -- but maybe these will be somewhat enlightening.

Of the fifty top CIA officials, the average is 15 years in intelligence and 13 years in CIA. There are more than 800 of our senior professionals who have been with the Agency since it was established in 1947. Our Station Chiefs  have been in intelligence for 16 and a half years, an average of 13 and a half in CIA.

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In the field of linguistic ability, three-quarters of our officers speak one language, and when you add up the whole Agency you can find individuals, or an individual, who speak 122 languages and dialects. In addition to this, large numbers of our analysts and people working in these

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programs have Ph. D degrees or at least M. A's, and when you do the statistics on the academic record it is, I think you would agree, impressive. This we try to keep up by in-house training. Also, sending individuals for courses of a year to various institutions, not the least of which is the National War College. We have tried to keep this up in such a fashion that those deserving and the forward-looking and advancing officers have an opportunity not only to catch their breath but to get some new disciplines and learn some different things, and to see a different perspective of life -- because after all, we have the same problem that everybody does - we tend to get a little bit parochial and complacent unless we get jazzed up every once in awhile.

We are now following what is the generally accepted Government practice of bringing in young men at the bottom and trying to bring them along in a career program - which we refer to as the Career Training Program, having formerly been known as the Junior Officer Trainee Program, which name for some reason fell into disrepute. I haven't yet caught up with why. I just woke up one day and found out the name of the program had been changed. These young officers are of a caliber and of an education that they would be competitive with the young officers going into the military services, the Foreign Service, banks, trust companies, law firms, or anyplace else. Most of them have advanced degrees. They vary in age from about 25, 27, to 35, and they come from all over the United States. It

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has frequently been said that the CIA is overloaded with Ivy League products, but if you were to look at each class of these young men coming in you would find that probably there were three or four from the three Ivy League colleges and the rest of them were not only well distributed all over the United States but some of them come from colleges I've never even heard of.

I would simply like to close where I began by saying that we are a member of the Government team, we want to work with you, we appreciate your working with us and allowing us to help in any way we can, and to assure you that we are not off on our own, that we don't have any mission that is counter to the U.S. interest, security, or otherwise, and that as the years go by we will look forward to a cooperative and I hope constructive relationship.

I would be glad to answer any questions for a few moments, if any of you have any.

Q. Mr. Helms, are the Soviets as closely controlled as you are?

DDCI: Yes, I think that the Soviets certainly are. As you know, the Soviets have two intelligence collection systems - one is the KGB and the other is the GRU. They work in parallel with each other but they are very carefully coordinated by a committee which sits just underneath the Soviet Presidium. They are an extension of Soviet foreign policy and of

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Soviet defense policy. They are even more closely integrated into their government than we are into ours, because the Soviets have no compunction about these matters, whereas in the United States there is something a little dirty about espionage and people don't like to be too closely identified with it. This inhibition does not exist in the Soviet Union, and they change uniforms just exactly the way a quick change artist goes off the stage and comes back a few moments later as something else, so that a man whom you've known as a Tass correspondent very readily may show up a couple of years later as the First Secretary of the Embassy in Vienna, or vice versa, or he may show up someplace else as a military officer in the military attache's office, or any of a variety of things. But there is no doubt about the fact that the operations of these organizations are closely integrated in the Soviet policy and are handmaidens of that Soviet policy.

Q. ....(inaudible)....

DDCI: Is this related to

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Q. ....(inaudible)....

DDCI: Well, each of them is sui generis. That's one thing that seems to characterize these difficulties. I'd be glad to discuss either of them, if you're interested.

The trouble that occurred in connection with the  business recently was that it turned out, by a strange concatenation of events,

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that three or four people in Government who knew the most about the [ ] incident were all on leave, coincidentally. And there you are. And when the State Department put out the denial it was simply a denial in innocence, and this obviously put a rather poor complexion on what was a rather poor thing anyway. I don't for a moment defend our having got caught in trying to recruit this individual [ ] We did indeed try to recruit him, and we did indeed get caught. The only thing we did not do was offer any bribes. This seems to have been the part of the story that has worried Congressmen and Senators, and various other people in Washington, most. But there isn't any truth to that at all. This business about the three million dollar bribe is just a cock and bull story. It is indeed true that [ ] [ ] tried to shake down the United States Government for 33 million dollars in aid, but it is not true that in return he was offered a three million dollar bribe.

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As for the U-2 business, much has been written about that and much has been talked about. An effort was made to follow the cover story which had been agreed on beforehand, but if you will go back and look over the series of events that occurred at the time, our Government was booby trapped by Khrushchev, who very carefully concealed certain facts he had for a certain length of time to allow us to fall into the bear trap. So when the going was getting very sticky indeed, the President made the decision

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to take the responsibility for it. And why General Eisenhower took this decision the way he did, is not known to me, and if it were known I don't think it would be my place to talk about it, anyway. Whether it will ever show up in one of the books he's writing, or not, I don't know, but it was certain that he made the decision personally to do this.

MODERATOR: Mr. Helms, thank you very much for a very excellent windup to a very excellent day at the Central Intelligence Agency.

DDCI: Thank you, gentlemen.

. . . . Applause . . . .

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